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Geographies of Lifelong Learning  
and the Knowledge Economy
Lifelong learning is traditionally defined as learning that continues 
throughout one’s life and that encompasses both traditional schooling 
and informal venues and practices. It is a form of learning most frequently 
undertaken by adults to improve their skills and knowledge so as to 
gain better employment opportunities. In this view, lifelong learning 
is a wonderful opportunity, one voluntarily engaged in and frequently 
enjoyed, leading to personal fulfillment as well as greater professional 
development and the chance to improve one’s life chances.
Lifelong learning can indeed be these things for individual actors, but 
as a governing concept and set of institutional practices it has broader, 
frequently negative repercussions for workers and for society as a whole. 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, the perceived skills necessary 
for contemporary employment success have shifted over the last few 
decades. These changes indicate the growth of new global divisions of 
labor, neoliberal rationalities of governance, and a related demand for 
the constant retraining, redevelopment, and redeployment of human 
capital worldwide. In this chapter I am interested in how the concept 
of lifelong learning was deployed by state actors at different scales of 
governance, including the supranational European Union (EU), to shift 
responsibility for retraining to the individual. I show further how the 
policies and institutions formed on the basis of this concept have worked 
to secure a capitalist process of exploitation that benefits a global elite far 
more than individual workers.
Lifelong learning plays a role in the production of space, not just as 
an abstract governing principle but also as a diverse set of practices 
and institutions that has developed and transformed over time and 
scale to address the crises of global capitalism. The concept of lifelong 
learning was first promoted in the early 1970s by intergovernmental 
organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Organization for Economic 
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Cooperation and Development (OECD). Similar in some ways to the 
formulations of multicultural education during the same time period, 
many of these organizations introduced ideals of democratic learning 
and personal development. These liberal ideals of individual freedom 
and growth were, at the same time, always linked with assumptions of 
economic necessity.
With the advance of neoliberal globalization in the 1990s, however, 
lifelong learning emerged in more narrowly strategic forms in the policy 
frameworks of the United States, Canada, and the EU. Neoliberal policies 
during this latter era worked to orchestrate personal development 
within the increasingly flexible processes of global capitalism, placing 
both within the rhythm of a personal life that must be fulfilled. Such an 
orchestration produced certain spaces—captured in notions such as the 
“learning society” and “creative city”—in which citizens were expected to 
take responsibility for their own human capital development as flexible 
entrepreneurs. For the majority of the population, however, this process 
led primarily to their own deskilling. Moreover, not only did lifelong 
learning strategies promote the standardization and homogenization of 
educational skills, and thus the abstraction and interchangeability of labor, 
but they were also bound up with the production of a so-called learning 
society that demanded increasing levels of external management. In the 
following sections I look at some of the ramifications of these processes 
on workers and systems of education.
Freedom and Necessity in Lifelong Learning
It is no accident that the concept of lifelong learning first gained traction 
in the early 1970s. As noted earlier, this was a time when a new interna-
tional division of labor was emerging and manufacturing jobs in core 
countries began moving offshore in greater numbers. Suddenly, large 
swaths of the workforce became obsolete, possessing skills that were no 
longer marketable within their national borders. These were primarily 
blue-collar jobs in heavy industries such as steel and automobile man-
ufacturing, as well as in mining and other forms of resource extraction.
Traditional forms of education—those that ended somewhere in the 
individual’s youth—seemed outdated against this backdrop, failing to 
meet the demands of a new global economy.1 The concept of lifelong 
learning emerged within policy circles and academia as a potential 
solution to this problem. The underlying assumption throughout this 
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period was that extending education into adulthood could provide a way 
of retraining workers in core countries, giving them the skills needed to 
compete in a rapidly globalizing economy.
Despite this clear economic imperative, however, during the 1970s 
lifelong learning was generally framed as a basic human right. This 
orientation was manifested in the Third International Conference 
on Adult Education, held in Tokyo in 1972, where it was declared 
that “the right of individuals to education, their right to learn and to 
go on learning, is to be considered on the same basis as their other 
fundamental rights.”2 This moment marked a strong reinterpretation of 
the right to education as originally stated in the UN’s 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. It seemed that the newly conceptualized 
human right was no longer ascribed to a time-bound notion of schooling 
connected to the possibilities of immediate employment, but rather to a 
process of learning and human development that continued through a 
person’s lifetime.
Owing to the stronger narrative of freedom and human rights in 
the documents of this era, some scholars argued that the concept and 
practices of lifelong learning changed radically from this early period 
vis-à-vis its more contemporary iterations. In this view, the earlier 
period of lifelong learning encouraged and enabled autonomous 
individual choices and personal development, but these opportunities 
were no longer viable in later years, and lifelong learning became more 
about necessity and economic survival in a rapidly transforming global 
economy.3 This scholarly analysis rested on abstract liberal assumptions 
about the potential for great individual opportunity and freedom in 
the Fordist period, which underplayed the importance of ongoing 
structuring forces in economy and society, including differences of race, 
gender, and age, as well as class position.
A more nuanced analysis situates lifelong learning as a concept 
and set of practices always implemented within capitalist regimes of 
accumulation, yet shifting in various ways in response to historical and 
geographical context. Further, it encompasses variations in identity and 
social position that are bound up in these broader social and economic 
forces. The most important of the changes affecting these types of 
educational processes today are the contemporary forces of globaliza-
tion and the rise of flexible regimes of accumulation and new spatial 
divisions of labor. Thus in looking at both the narrative and practices of 
lifelong learning it is critical to examine the underpinning connections 
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of lifelong learning to broader capitalist dynamics, including processes 
of commoditization, whereby learning is turned into a possession that 
can be bought and sold on the marketplace. But at the same time it is 
equally important to tease out the variations, divergences, and contra-
dictions that occur as lifelong learning is introduced to different groups 
and taken up in different times and places.
The merging of both freedom and necessity in early lifelong learning 
formulations is evident in some of the first policy documents published 
by UNESCO and the OECD.4 On the one hand, UNESCO and the 
OECD differed greatly in their approaches. While UNESCO emphasized 
lifelong learning as a basic human right, the OECD was more concerned 
with lifelong learning as an economic fix. These rationales were not 
incompatible, however. On the contrary, when reading the UNESCO and 
OECD documents side by side, what becomes evident is that the concept 
of lifelong learning provided a site for joining, and thereby legitimizing, 
the flexibilization of labor with certain liberal-humanist conceptions of 
personal development. While the introduction and implementation of 
lifelong learning has varied in tone and emphasis over time, this basic 
articulation remains a core feature.
In the OECD document, lifelong learning was endorsed as a way 
of generating the occupational flexibility necessary to succeed in an 
economy with constant technological developments and new labor 
demands. It was imagined that through lifelong learning programs, the 
unemployed could not only acquire more marketable skills “but also 
become a manpower reserve on which the various countries’ economies 
could draw.”5 Lifelong learning was thus seen as a way of producing 
an educated “reserve army of labor” in a period of economic change. 
Radical critiques of capitalism have noted how this type of reserve army 
can benefit capitalist economies because it provides an easily exploitable 
pool of labor, which tends to drive down the average cost of wages for 
everyone.6
What is interesting about the OECD report is how such large-scale 
economic imperatives were paired with the language of individual choice. 
Despite the strong emphasis on economic development, the report’s 
authors indicated that lifelong learning would only be successful when 
conceived and opted into as a process that also benefited  individuals. 
This trend of conceptually binding and blurring economic growth with 
personal satisfaction and a sense of individual value is one that has 
continued through the historical trajectory of lifelong learning. In the 
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following section I examine how these intersections were implemented 
in national policies, which have similarly tied personal growth to issues 
of employability and economic development.
The Boom Years: Lifelong Learning in the 1990s
It was not until the late 1990s in the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and Canada, that lifelong learning reached its peak popularity 
as educational policy. These years saw a flood of policy documents and 
reports calling for lifelong learning at both national and supranational 
scales. In Europe, the concept became a key policy agenda in 1996 after 
the European Commission (EC) christened that year as the European 
Year of Lifelong Learning.7 In the United Kingdom, in particular, lifelong 
learning was an important component of New Labour’s education policy. 
The government’s first major statement on it came out in 1998, in an 
enthusiastic report entitled “The Learning Age: A Renaissance for a New 
Britain.”8 Similar eagerness was found in North America, where the US 
Congress ratified the Lifelong Learning Credit (LLC) in 1997 and the 
Canadian government rolled out the Lifelong Learning Plan (LLP) in the 
federal budget for 1998.9
Consistent across these policy documents was the view of education 
as a strategic economic investment. This was typical of the kind of “third 
way” politics popular in these countries at the time, under the leadership 
of Tony Blair in the United Kingdom, Bill Clinton in the United States, 
and Jean Chrétien in Canada. While third-way politics played out 
differently in each of these countries, there was a similar emphasis 
on investments in personal development, responsibility, and equal 
opportunity through market-based solutions rather than via centralized 
government programs. The most infamous example of this was in the 
move from welfare to workfare under President Clinton.
The shift in the social safety net from government provision to 
one of individual responsibility was particularly evident in education. 
Blair’s position was manifested most clearly in “The Learning Age,” a 
government report in which lifelong learning was held up as a tool for 
developing “the skills, knowledge and understanding that are essential 
for employability and fulfilment.”10 Notions of personal growth and 
well-being were repeatedly and insistently connected with economic 
strategies, inseparable from the essential ability to sell one’s labor on 
the global market. Thus, under the aegis of New Labour’s policies on 
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lifelong learning, personal fulfillment and employability came to mean 
the same thing. Moreover, the necessity to opt in to this neoliberal nexus 
of human capital development—or suffer the consequences—was quite 
explicit.
In the United States and Canada during the same time period, lifelong 
learning policy was also tied to personal growth and individual income 
set within the framework of the new global economy. Canada’s LLP, 
for instance, was one of several Canadian federal policies on education 
and training implemented with the explicit intention of developing a 
high-skilled knowledge economy.11 It allowed individuals to withdraw 
money from their registered retirement savings plans to enroll in higher 
education or training programs for at least three months. The ways in 
which these loan-based policies were set up urged individuals formerly 
disconnected or excluded from the global economy to reskill themselves 
and become responsible entrepreneurial actors in the new era.12
Canada’s LLP provides an excellent example of neoliberal governance, 
wherein policies promoted at the state level devolve the responsibility 
for successful labor market access and employment to the individual. 
In comparison with the preceding Fordist regime, where the state 
was involved in and responsible for producing the conditions for full 
employment, both the risk and the responsibility of employment now 
fell completely to the individual worker. This worker, moreover, had to 
understand the optimal conditions for employment, prepare himself or 
herself for these opportunities—even prospective ones—and pay for 
the possibility of success out of retirement accounts, thus effectively 
withdrawing on his/her own future.13 The individual thus became 
financially indebted to his or her future self, and encouraged to act and 
self-manage in ways that ensured that educational investments actually 
paid off economically. Indeed, the government’s explicit goal for this loan 
was to enable individuals to increase their earning potential, framing 
education solely as a means of access to future global marketability.
The LLC in the United States worked a bit differently, but maintained 
a similar third-way politics of individual responsibility. Rather than 
withdrawing money from a retirement fund, the LLC provided students 
with a nonrefundable tax credit for post secondary education expenses. 
The LLC was part of a larger overhaul of the way that government 
financed higher education, and included other programs such as the 
Hope Scholarship Credit (later replaced by the American Opportunity 
Tax Credit), an expansion of savings plans such as education IRAs 
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(individual retirement accounts), and student loan interest deductions. 
These changes occurred at both the federal and state level in the United 
States throughout the 1990s, amidst rising tuition rates, reduced funding 
for public institutions of higher learning, and an increasingly inadequate 
supply of direct grants for student aid.14
The LLC and Hope Scholarship, the largest of these education 
initiatives, represented a shift away from needs-based federal programs. 
Tied to tax liability, these programs offered no direct scholarships to pay 
for the rising costs of tuition. Lower income families had to resort to 
other means of paying the upfront costs of college, such as taking out 
loans. Using the tax system to subsidize higher education thus worked 
to indirectly shift responsibility from government services onto the 
individual to pay for his or her own education. At the same time, for 
those who received tax credits, the savings appeared less as a free welfare 
handout, and more as a reward for “good behavior”—in the sense of being 
employed (having a taxable income) and choosing to invest in education 
or lifelong learning. Indirectly, therefore, the individual was nudged into 
and made responsible within certain normative value systems—systems 
that aligned with the social reproduction of capitalist relations.
In practice, this type of individual responsibilization did not play out 
evenly across social divisions of class, gender, race, and age. In Canada, 
for example, while the LLP and similar federal education policies 
claimed to enable equal access, in fact they continued to exclude the most 
marginalized segments of the population. Individuals could withdraw 
from their registered retirement savings plans in order to improve their 
earning potential only if they had already earned enough to contribute 
to a retirement account in the first place.15 As such, the LLP served to 
help those already relatively well off. Similar arguments were made 
about the LLC in the United States, which was explicitly conceived to aid 
middle-class Americans. Most low-income students had no tax liability 
and were therefore not eligible to receive the LLC tax credit.
Although there were other federal programs to assist low-income 
students such as the Pell Grant in the United States, it is nonetheless 
significant that federal policy on lifelong learning in both countries 
offered minimal benefits to those out of work or precariously employed. 
In some ways, policies such as the LLC and LLP worked to actively 
produce this precarity, insofar as the solutions offered were limited 
to the market mechanisms that produced these vulnerabilities in the 
first place. Through the economization of education and personal 
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development, other potential forms of addressing insecurity—for 
example, through resource distribution or mutual aid—were ignored or 
deemed financially imprudent.
From Integration to Responsibilization in the EU
In the preceding section I investigated some of the ways that state 
policies associated with lifelong learning were introduced in the United 
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom at the turn of the twenty-first 
century. Many of these emphases can also be seen in the EU, but there 
were some interesting differences as well. In some ways similar to the 
postwar discourse of multiculturalism in England, the earlier iterations 
of lifelong learning in the EU contained a stronger narrative of social 
inclusion and the value of cultural diversity with respect to minority 
integration into European society. But this emphasis began to erode in 
the context of neoliberal pressures towards strategic learning for the 
global knowledge economy.
Although neoliberal ideas and actors started to dominate policy-
making in the 1990s, they operated in tension with more interventionist 
programs initiated in the earlier era. Internal divisions and struggles over 
these programs were particularly evident in the realm of social policy and 
the politics of European social cohesion. In the sphere of education and 
training, the EU’s primary role was to support its member states and to 
address what were considered to be common challenges for all nations. 
These included the ageing of the population, the changing skills needed 
for the European workforce as a whole, technological transformations, 
and global competition. With the broad shift towards more laissez-faire 
practices and beliefs, education became a critical site of struggle over 
the funding priorities and institutional policies associated with these 
common challenges. Lifelong learning was one of the many mandates 
caught up in this struggle, as an interest in diversity and social cohesion 
slowly lost ground to a more economistic logic of governance.
The shift in the EU’s educational emphasis was particularly evident 
in the policy orientation of the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, among other 
treaties of that time period. Programs promoting state intervention, 
including attempts to encourage cohesive European social communities, 
began to lose ground to a more economistic emphasis following the 
treaty’s passage. Rather than the social control of labor through the 
management of difference, EU programs started to focus more on 
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strategies of skills-based training designed to forge all students (both 
native-born and immigrant) into European citizens via an increasingly 
cross-border intra-EU labor market.
Lifelong learning was a prominent feature in the so-called “employ-
ment chapter” of the Amsterdam Treaty. The employment chapter called 
on member states to coordinate their employment policy with respect to 
four common pillars: employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability, and 
equal opportunities. The type of employment that was envisioned in the 
treaty was flexible employment, and the laborers who were to provide 
the workforce were required to be adaptable and entrepreneurial if they 
expected to obtain and retain jobs. This emphasis on workers’ employ-
ability rather than workplace conditions represented a significant change 
in EU policy. According to one labor historian, the policy action areas 
of the employment chapter “represent[ed] a major shift in social policy” 
away from universal labor mandates and standards and toward a vision 
of employment as the key to maintaining the European social model.16
In this vision, lifelong learning was explicitly linked with the promotion 
of a skilled and adaptable labor force for the new, so-called “Europe of 
knowledge.” In EC policy documents of this time period the necessity 
of constant personal mobilization, or what was then termed “updating,” 
was a frequent refrain in reference to lifelong learning, and was inevitably 
linked with the employment requirements of a rapidly changing world. 
Further, successful employment was implicitly associated with successful 
citizenship. The following quote, from the 1997 EC document, “Towards 
a Europe of Knowledge,” was one of the first discussions of the new 
strategies for education and training in general, and of lifelong learning in 
particular, that was envisioned for the EC’s policy agenda of 2000–2006:
Real wealth creation will henceforth be linked to the production and 
dissemination of knowledge and will depend first and foremost on 
our efforts in the field of research, education and training and on 
our capacity to promote innovation. This is why we must fashion a 
veritable “Europe of knowledge.” This process is directly linked to the 
aim of developing lifelong learning which the Union has set itself and 
which has been incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty, expressing 
the determination of the Union to promote the highest level of 
knowledge for its people through broad access to education and its 
permanent updating.17
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This utilitarian vision of lifelong learning as linked with wealth 
creation and employability was advanced further by the EU’s education 
commissioner, Viviane Reding, in 2000 and 2001. In the policy agenda 
of this period there was a clear effort to tie together the commission 
Directorate of Education and Culture with the Directorate of 
Employment and Social Affairs. The skills-based, vocational focus of 
this cooperative strategy was made explicit in related documents and 
speeches. For example, Anna Diamantopoulou, the commissioner for 
employment and social affairs, said:
Skill and competence enhancement in the new economy in Europe 
requires that the policy emphasis is shifted towards increasing 
investment in human capital and in raising participation in education 
and training throughout working life. To keep pace with developments 
in technology, globalisation, population ageing and new business 
practices, particular attention should be given to workplace training, 
an important dimension of our strategy for Lifelong Learning.18
In March 2000, the Lisbon meeting of the European Council confirmed 
lifelong learning as a foundational component of the European social 
model. Employment was a key agenda item of the Lisbon meeting, as 
was the objective of shaping a new Europe and becoming “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world.”19 As 
a result of the Lisbon recommendations, lifelong learning was allocated 
significant funding for the period 2000–2006 from the European 
Social Fund and was confirmed as a “basic component of the European 
Social Model.”20 
In the speeches and documents associated with the Lisbon meeting, 
perpetual mobilization (formation permanente) was projected as 
constant, inevitable, and ultimately beneficial for society. The goal of 
“shaping a new Europe” focused on the importance of the transition 
to the knowledge economy and on the role of education and training 
in constituting a new dynamic and competitive European labor force. 
In this vision the challenge of reformation and retraining was devolved 
from the responsibility of the state to the agency of individuals, who were 
expected to choose personally effective learning strategies.
In the rhetoric of globalization, competition, and lifelong learning of 
that time period there was a strong underlying push for constant personal 
mobilization and entrepreneurial behavior on the part of individuals, 
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while at the same time the many structural and institutional constraints 
to achieving these goals were obscured. Further, the inexorable emphasis 
on the individual and on his or her educational choices constructed 
rational, atomized agents responsible for their own life paths in lieu 
of groups or classes experiencing collective dislocation as the result 
of widespread socioeconomic restructuring under the processes of 
neoliberal globalization. This accompanied a more general abdication 
of responsibilities in providing truly viable economic opportunities 
for workers and/or for the harmonious integration of immigrants and 
minorities into European society. 
Further, the original personal and social development emphasis of 
lifelong learning as detailed in earlier documents from the 1970s was 
relegated to a minor rhetorical key. Community funds for lifelong 
learning went primarily into workplace retraining programs rather 
than into curricula emphasizing social or civic education such as the 
study of culture, comparative democracy, or systems of government. 
Thus, with the transformation of lifelong learning, European social 
cohesion became advanced more through the formation of a flexible 
and mobile cross-border labor force than through the notion of personal 
development and the constitution of democratic participants in society. 
In all of these transformations there was a demonstrable effort by 
elites to shape Europe into the most premier knowledge economy in the 
world. In EU programs and discourses of the time one can see attempts 
to construct a fast-paced, mobile, and interchangeable laborer for this 
knowledge venue. Earlier concerns about the importance of social 
cohesion, including the emphasis on achieving diversity as beneficial for 
civic life and for the development of a European community, were replaced 
or accompanied with economistic assumptions about individual human 
capital. Moreover, it became the individual’s responsibility to integrate 
effectively. If he or she did not, it was projected as an issue of individual 
choice rather than the failure of the egalitarian claims of liberalism.
These transformations were broadly linked with macroeconomic 
shifts relating to late-twentieth-century systems of flexible accumulation 
and the rise of neoliberalism as a political philosophy of governance. 
Indeed, the educational directives of the EU during this time did not 
just line up in accordance with these broader shifts but were in fact key 
mechanisms in reconstructing governance structures more widely. As 
the EU expanded through the early 2000s it began to take on a more 
productive, and some argue greater imperial role in shaping policy, 
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disciplining member states, and forming a European educational space 
that served as a “division of the neoliberal army.”21
The educational strategies of this time, as Susan Robertson has 
noted, began to point towards a European project and vision of global 
leadership in the production of higher learning and knowledge in the 
European interest.22 Knowledge, in this image of the future—for both 
Europeans and North Americans— required not just the cooperation of 
choice-making and entrepreneurial individuals and learners, but also the 
spaces and managerial experts of a brave new society.
Spaces of the Knowledge Economy, Creative Cities,  
and the New Managerial Elite
When it first appeared in policy and academic discourse, lifelong 
learning was often coupled with the concepts of the learning society or 
the knowledge economy. All of these concepts emerged around the same 
time from scholars in the fields of education and management. These 
discourses reinforced a mythology that treated knowledge as a social and 
economic panacea. At the heart of this mythology was the figure of the 
knowledge worker. Peter Drucker, who coined the term in the 1950s, 
defined knowledge workers as “accountants, engineers, social workers, 
nurses, computer experts of all kinds, teachers and researchers,” or, more 
broadly, people “who are paid for putting knowledge to work rather than 
brawn or manual skill.”23
In Europe, the lifelong education of knowledge workers and the 
construction of the so-called knowledge economy could be best con-
ceptualized as a space for new kinds of market opportunities. Both 
the language and the policies of lifelong learning and the knowledge 
economy carved out a terrain in which education and work were yoked 
together in a complex construction of personal value and human capital 
development, national and transnational community, and territory. This 
agglomeration provided multiple spaces for capital accumulation.
In the United States, the mythos of knowledge work was grafted onto 
popular imaginations of urban space through concepts such as the 
creative city, first pitched in the late 1980s. More recent buzzwords have 
included “smart city,” “learning city,” “knowledge city,” and “resilient 
city.” The creative city was first discussed in Richard Florida’s famous 
thesis about the rise of the creative class.24 Florida argued that in the 
context of deindustrialization and the decline of manufacturing in core 
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countries, knowledge workers were the emergent demographic critical 
for postindustrial cities to survive (rather than the older demographic 
segment appropriate for older manufacturing-based economies). 
For Florida, the creative class in the United States was an increasingly 
important and valuable subsection of the workforce. It included a 
“super-creative core” of occupations focusing on the creative process and 
problem solving, as well as a group of creative professionals consisting of 
knowledge-based workers more generally. In the contemporary global 
economy, according to Florida, this class acted as a major driver of 
economic growth through its ability to innovate, as well as its ability to be 
flexible and adapt to changing economic needs. As a result, cities should 
make every effort to attract these workers. Florida argued that creative 
types were particularly drawn to cities that fostered cultural values of 
diversity, openness, and tolerance—in the business realm but also in 
terms of an artistic and bohemian scene. 
Placing such a premium on knowledge work and creativity recast the 
city as a marketing hub for the promotion of an edgy brand or lifestyle, 
one that it pitted against other cities in the competition over so-called 
creative talent. This culture industry was, however, geared towards 
a very small segment of the working population. Not only did certain 
cities lose out in the scramble for creative labor, but the elite utopia of the 
creative city—as it played out in the policies, investment strategies, and 
development projects installed for attracting and retaining the creative 
class—tended to intensify urban inequalities along lines of class, gender, 
and race. 
Florida’s ideas were extremely persuasive to those urban politicians 
and institutions struggling to fashion their cities in ways attractive to 
international capital investment. Creating an urban revival by courting 
the “hip and cool” was a relatively cheap strategy, and one that urban 
elites embraced wholeheartedly in the early 2000s. But, as Jamie Peck 
has shown, the main benefits of this “good business climate” strategy—
one of appealing to the most creative members of society through the 
provision of things like bike lanes, attractive downtown housing, and 
gay-friendly policies—has flowed primarily to real estate developers and 
members of the urban elite. It has neither galvanized urban economies 
nor trickled down to lower-wage workers, as initially conceptualized.25 
Indeed, the strategy actively worked against the interests of the poor 
and lower-income residents of cities. It often intensified gentrification 
processes and discouraged the intervention of local governments in 
This content downloaded from 128.114.34.22 on Tue, 09 Apr 2019 20:27:34 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
80 . making workers
providing social services and affordable housing to the insufficiently 
flexible or “non-creative” members of society.
The global promotion of the knowledge economy and its spatial man-
ifestation in creative cities or a “Europe of tomorrow” policy sphere had 
widespread and lingering effects beyond economic exclusion. Cultural 
assumptions about personal worth and the value of certain kinds of 
work were (and remain) deeply affected by this discourse. As Oakley 
and O’Brien have noted:
The workforce of these industries, the “creative class” celebrated by 
policymakers and depicted as key to economic growth … is seen to 
be endowed with particular characteristics—flexibility, adaptability, 
creativity and even “tolerance”—which are themselves often the 
product of stratification. To be lacking in these qualities is to be 
designated as not having value or worth in society.26
Oakley and O’Brien demonstrated further how these webs of belief 
about labor and value played out in schools and in higher education 
admissions, as well as in cultural labor markets. Moreover, even as 
admissions directors and urban policy makers made value judgments 
about worthy students and valued workers, so too did the students and 
workers themselves.
The effort to become a valued member of society through higher 
education or lifelong learning, or otherwise joining the ranks of the 
knowledge economy, is now a global phenomenon, as discussed in Part 
I. But the success of this effort remains stratified not just by class and 
other axes of difference, but also by culture itself. In a vicious cycle, 
the spaces of the knowledge economy and the creative city are linked 
to certain characteristics of learning, and these in turn are associated 
with forms of cultural capital attributed to the (largely white, primarily 
male) middle classes. Even when those of lower social class obtain higher 
degrees or certificates of advanced learning, they are comparatively dis-
advantaged in mobilizing these experiences and forms of knowledge 
to access the labor market. Thus the desired cultural attributes of the 
knowledge economy and creative city workers—such as creativity and 
tolerance—continue to advantage the elite even as its promoters suggest 
the opposite. 
Lifelong learning poses as an important path to individual autonomy 
and freedom as well as economic stability for workers, especially for 
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those who have been displaced by economic restructuring. Yet the same 
blockages to social mobility that are encountered in more traditional 
educational pathways remain in place. In this sense, the promotion of 
creativity, flexibility, and tolerance as necessary characteristics of the “new 
economy” worker can be seen as something of a red herring—examples 
of a larger process of depoliticization wherein, despite the liberal patina 
of change, underlying problems of inequality, immobility, and injustice 
remain intact. Against the backdrop of the new economy, the latter 
appear as the products of intolerance or inflexibility. They become issues 
of psychological or cultural difference—intolerant ways of life—rather 
than structural imbalances demanding concrete political action.27
Whatever its good intentions, the uncritical demand for increasing 
worker creativity and tolerance fails to acknowledge the historical and 
geographic exclusions that allow for this new kind of worker to emerge 
in the first place. Those unable to pick up the torch of flexibility—a single 
mother, an impoverished teen, a non-native speaker—are demonized as 
logjams in an otherwise progressive system.
Such paradoxical freedom is most evident in the way the production 
of knowledge workers has been coupled with an increased need for 
managing these “autonomous” workers. This is apparent in Drucker’s 
writings on knowledge work. On the one hand, he emphasized how the 
worker was most productive when unsupervised: “He [sic] must direct, 
manage and motivate himself.”28 Yet Drucker mentioned elsewhere that 
a knowledge society “requires … that knowledge and the knowledge 
worker be managed productively.”29
Drucker’s ambivalence points to a deeper contradiction within 
capitalist accumulation, one that becomes very pronounced in a 
knowledge economy. This is the tension, noted by Marx, between the need 
to increase the level of cooperation between workers (to increase their 
productive power) and the need to control this cooperation (to orient it 
towards the aims of profit). In theory, by bringing workers together in 
new ways, cooperation produces the conditions for a collective power 
among labor and thus poses a potential threat to “the domination of 
power.”30 It is in reaction to the threat of resistance that, for Marx, the role 
of the modern manager emerges and becomes necessary for continued 
accumulation—“the work of directing, superintending, and adjusting.”31
Marx would have found this kind of managerial work even more 
imperative in a knowledge economy, where the ideal worker is 
presumably given a larger degree of freedom and autonomy as an entre-
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preneurial actor in the global market. On the one hand, the dissemination 
of knowledge as a commodity presupposes a new kind of management 
style—a form of governance—whereby the worker comes to manage 
himself or herself in line with the interests of efficiency, flexibility, and 
the creation of profit. This is a kind of dispossession by possession, in 
which the worker becomes nudged into norms of productivity through 
his or her acquisition of mythic “knowledge.” Through the commoditi-
zation of education, getting ahead in the global economy means working 
on yourself, acquiring new skills when needed, learning to invest in what 
the market demands.
At the same time, in line with Marx’s arguments about management, 
the knowledge economy demands external governance as well. 
Knowledge must be policed and shaped to fit the socket holes of profit. 
In the United States this is demonstrated by the explosive growth of the 
managerial and professional classes in recent decades.
The dissemination of “business knowledge” since the 1960s is what 
Nigel Thrift called the “cultural circuit of capital.”32 Within this cultural 
circuit—where individual knowledge and economic success become 
interchangeable concepts—managerial coercion appears natural. Against 
the linear narrative of consent replacing coercion in the workplace, 
the management literature on knowledge work suggests that external 
coercion remains, and even increases, as an important tool for aligning 
the goals of the worker with those of the firm.
What has changed, as Michael Burawoy has noted, is the extent to 
which coercion becomes naturalized within the firm and internalized 
within the individual.33 Rather than a separate force, coercion appears as 
the object of consent when the individual chooses to opt in to a system of 
rules. When knowledge is fetishized as an organizational principle within 
the firm, the ideal manager acquires the status of an all-knowing guru or 
visionary leader. It is in this way, as Antonio Gramsci recognized long 
ago, that knowledge becomes weaponized along class lines as “cultural 
hegemony.”34 Today, the cultural hegemony of capital serves to empower 
a managerial class, an elite group of individuals given special access to 
and mobility across the contours of capitalism.
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